Capital Regulation and Tail Risk

Enrico Perotti, Lev Ratnovski () and Razvan Vlahu

No 8526, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: The paper studies risk mitigation associated with capital regulation, in a context where banks may choose tail risk assets. We show that this undermines the traditional result that higher capital reduces excess risk-taking driven by limited liability. Moreover, higher capital may have an unintended e¤ect of enabling banks to take more tail risk without the fear of breaching the minimal capital ratio in nontail risky project realizations. The results are consistent with stylized facts about pre-crisis bank behavior, and suggest implications for the optimal design of capital regulation.

Keywords: Capital regulation; Keywords: banking; Risk; Risk-taking; Systemic risk; Tail risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-rmg and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Capital Regulation and Tail Risk (2011)
Working Paper: Capital Regulation and Tail Risk (2011)
Working Paper: Capital Regulation and Tail Risk (2011)
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