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Private Provision of Public Goods and Information Diffusion in Social Groups

Kimberley Scharf

No 8607, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We describe a model of fundraising in social groups, where private information about quality of provision is transmitted by social proximity. Individuals engage in voluntary provision of a pure collective good that is consumed by both neighbors and non-neighbors. We show that, unlike in the case of private goods, better informed individuals face positive incentives to incur a cost to share information with their neighbors. These incentives are stronger, and provision of the pure public good greater, the smaller are individuals? social neighborhoods.

Keywords: Private provision of public goods; Social learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 D7 H1 L3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-cta, nep-pbe, nep-pub, nep-soc and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS AND INFORMATION DIFFUSION IN SOCIAL GROUPS (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Private Provision of Public Goods and Information Diffusion in Social Groups (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Private Provision of Public Goods and Information Diffusion in Social Groups (2011) Downloads
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