Sale of Visas: A Smuggler's Final Song?

Emmanuelle Auriol and Alice Mesnard

No 8965, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study how smugglers respond to different types of migration policies - legalisation through the sale of migration visas, or more traditional repressive policies through borders' enforcement, employers' sanctions or deportation - by changing the price they propose to illegal migrants. In this context a government that aims at eradicating smugglers and controlling migration flows faces a trade-off. Eliminating smugglers by the sale of visas increases the flows of migrants and may worsen their skill composition. In contrast, repressive policies decrease the flows of illegal migrants and may improve their skill composition but do not eliminate smugglers. We then study how a combination of increased repression -through reinforced external and internal controls- and sale of visas may be effective at eliminating smugglers and controlling migration flows while not weighing on public finances. Simulations allow us to quantify the partial equilibrium effects of the policies under study.

Keywords: Legalisation; Market structure; Migration; Migration policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 I18 L51 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-iue and nep-mig
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Sale of Visas: a Smuggler's Final Song? (2016)
Working Paper: Sale of visas: a smuggler's final song? (2016)
Working Paper: Sale Of Visas: A Smuggler's Final Song? (2012)
Working Paper: Sale of Visas: A Smuggler’s Final Song? (2012)
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