Geographic Access Rules and Investments

Steffen Hoernig and Carlo Cambini
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Marc Bourreau

No 9013, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We analyze competition between vertically integrated infrastructure operators that provide access in different geographical areas. A regulator may impose a uniform access price, set local access rates, or deregulate access locally. We analyze the impact of these alternative regulatory regimes on network investments. While cost-based access leads to both suboptimal rollout and duplication, uniform access prices bring too much duplication. Deregulation in competitive areas can spur investment and lead to social optimum, or call for continued regulatory intervention, depending on the resulting wholesale equilibrium.

Keywords: Geographical access regulation; Infrastructure investment; Next generation networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo, nep-net, nep-tre and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Geographic Access Rules and Investments (2013)
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