The Price of Media Capture and the Looting of Newspapers in Interwar France

Marc Flandreau and Vincent Bignon

No 9014, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper develops a new insight enabling the empirical study of media capture: minority shareholders of newspapers and readers face similar risks. Both are adversely affected when corrupt insiders use the newspaper for personal profit and receive invisible revenues. This means that relevant data on influence and exploitation of newspaper has been hiding in plain sight in stock exchange or over-the-counter prices, since stock transactions reflect the value of this capture. Empirical data is consistent with increasing levels of looting in France during the 1930s. We provide a comparison with Britain and argue that Britain managed to protect its newspapers better.

Keywords: Control premium; Corruption; France; Governance; Interwar; Media; Minority shareholders (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 G34 L82 N24 N74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul, nep-his and nep-hme
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: The Price of Media Capture and the Looting of Newspapers in Interwar France (2012)
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