Who Needs the Nation State?

Dani Rodrik

No 9040, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The design of institutions is shaped by a fundamental trade-off. On the one hand, relationships and heterogeneity push governance down. On the other, the scale and scope benefits of market integration push governance up. A corner solution is rarely optimal. An intermediate outcome, a world divided into diverse polities, is the best that we can do.

Keywords: Globalization; Nation state (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F0 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Who Needs the Nation State? (2012)
Working Paper: Who Needs the Nation State? (2012)
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