Legalizing Bribe Giving

Giancarlo Spagnolo and Martin Dufwenberg

No 9236, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: A model of harassment bribes (paid for services one is entitled to) is developed and used to analyze the recent proposal to legalize paying bribes while increasing fines on accepting bribes. We explore performance as regards corruption deterrence and public service provision. A modified scheme, where immunity is conditional on reporting, addresses some key objections. We highlight complementarities with other policies aimed at improving accountability and performance of law enforcement agencies, and discuss the relevance for fighting other forms of corruption.

Keywords: Bribes; Corruption; Immunity; Law enforcement; Leniency; Whistleblowers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 K42 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
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Related works:
Journal Article: LEGALIZING BRIBE GIVING (2015)
Working Paper: Legalizing Bribe Giving (2014)
Working Paper: Legalizing Bribes (2013)
Working Paper: Legalizing Bribes (2011)
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