Cable Regulation in the Internet Era
Gregory Crawford
No 9316, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
The market for multi-channel video programming has undergone considerable change in the last 15 years. Direct-Broadcast Satellite service, spurred by 1999 legislation that leveled the playing field with cable television systems, has grown from 3% to 33% of the U.S. MVPD (cable, satellite, and telco video) market. Telephone operators have entered in some parts of the US and online video distributors are a growing source of television viewing. This chapter considers the merits of cable television regulation in light of these developments. It surveys the dismal empirical record on the effects of price regulation in cable and the more encouraging but incomplete evidence on the benefits of satellite and telco competition. It concludes with a consideration of four open issues in cable markets: horizontal concentration and vertical integration in the programming market, bundling by both cable systems and programmers, online video distribution, and temporary programming blackouts from failed carriage negotiations for both broadcast and cable programming. While the distribution market is clearly now more competitive, concerns in each of these areas remain.
Keywords: Bundling; Cable television; Competition; Foreclosure; Internet; Pay television; Regulation; Satellite television (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L41 L42 L43 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ict, nep-ind and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP9316 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9316
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP9316
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().