The Geography of Inter-State Resource Wars

Francesco Caselli, Massimo Morelli and Dominic Rohner

No 9440, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We establish a theoretical as well as empirical framework to assess the role of resource endowments and their geographic location for inter-State conflict. The main predictions of the theory are that conflict tends to be more likely when at least one country has natural resources; when the resources in the resource-endowed country are closer to the border; and, in the case where both countries have natural resources, when the resources are located asymmetrically vis-a-vis the border. We test these predictions on a novel dataset featuring oilfield distances from bilateral borders. The empirical analysis shows that the presence and location of oil are significant and quantitatively important predictors of inter-State conflicts after WW2.

Keywords: Natural resources; Oil; War (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Geography of Interstate Resource Wars (2015)
Working Paper: The geography of interstate resource wars (2015)
Working Paper: The Geography of Inter-State Resource Wars (2013)
Working Paper: The geography of inter-state resource wars (2013)
Working Paper: The Geography of Inter-State Resource Wars (2013)
Working Paper: The Geography of Inter-State Resource Wars (2013)
Working Paper: The Geography of Inter-State Resource Wars (2013)
Working Paper: The Geography of Inter-State Resource Wars (2012)
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