Benchmarking Politicians
Antonio Estache and
Renaud Foucart
No 9467, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
We study a political system in which voters can optimally pick between political platforms, but cannot screen the quality of individual politicians associated with these platforms. A bad individual achievement can correspond to either incompetence (adverse selection) or corruption (moral hazard). Information could improve, if independent experts assess achievements as compared to commitments, allowing independent judges to investigate possible corruption. We find that while good experts are always beneficial as they increase transparency, the impact of the quality of judges is ambiguous. Above a threshold, with risk-averse social planners, good judges increase the incentive-compatible punishment of politicians, at the cost of possible judiciary mistakes.
JEL-codes: D7 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta and nep-pol
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Working Paper: Benchmarking Politicians (2013)
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