R&D Networks: Theory, Empirics and Policy Implications

Yves Zenou, Michael Koenig and Xiaodong Liu
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Michael David König

No 9872, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study a structural model of R&D alliance networks in which firms jointly form R&D collaborations to lower their production costs while competing on the product market. We derive the Nash equilibrium of this game, provide a welfare analysis and determine the optimal R&D subsidy program that maximizes total welfare. We also identify the key firms, i.e. the firms whose exit would reduce welfare the most. We then structurally estimate our model using a panel dataset of R&D collaborations and annual company reports. We use our estimates to identify the key firms and analyze the impact of R&D subsidy programs. Moreover, we analyze temporal changes in the rankings of key firms and how these changes affect the optimal R&D policy.

Keywords: Key firms; Optimal subsidies; R&d networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D85 L24 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cse, nep-ino and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

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Working Paper: R&D Networks: Theory, Empirics and Policy Implications (2014)
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