Political Competition and the Limits of Political Compromise
Emanuel Ornelas and
Alexandre Cunha
No 9909, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
We consider an economy where competing political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimum level. Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party curbs excessive spending when in office if they expect future governments to do the same. We find that, if the government cannot manipulate state variables, more intense political competition fosters a compromise that yields better outcomes, potentially even the first best. By contrast, if the government can issue debt, vigorous political competition can render a compromise unsustainable and drive the economy to a low-welfare, high-debt, long-run trap. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative tradeoff between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt.
Keywords: Efficient policies; Political turnover; Public debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E61 E62 H30 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mac and nep-pol
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Related works:
Working Paper: Political Competition and the Limits of Political Compromise (2014)
Working Paper: Political Competition and the Limits of Political Compromise (2014)
Working Paper: Political competition and the limits of political compromise (2014)
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