Ex post information rents in sequential screening
Roland Strausz and
Krähmer, Daniel
No 9927, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive, whereas they are zero in continuous models. Consequently, full disclosure of ex post information is generally suboptimal. Optimal disclosure rules trade off the benefits from adapting the allocation to better information against the effect that more information aggravates truth-telling.
Keywords: Information disclosure; Information rents; Sequential screening (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Ex post information rents in sequential screening (2015)
Working Paper: Ex Post Information Rents in Sequential Screening (2014)
Working Paper: Ex post information rents in sequential screening (2014)
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