Ex post information rents in sequential screening

Roland Strausz and Krähmer, Daniel

No 9927, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive, whereas they are zero in continuous models. Consequently, full disclosure of ex post information is generally suboptimal. Optimal disclosure rules trade off the benefits from adapting the allocation to better information against the effect that more information aggravates truth-telling.

Keywords: Information disclosure; Information rents; Sequential screening (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP9927 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Ex post information rents in sequential screening (2015)
Working Paper: Ex Post Information Rents in Sequential Screening (2014)
Working Paper: Ex post information rents in sequential screening (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9927

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP9927

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().