Under the Thumb of History? Political Institutions and the Scope for Action

Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo

No 9997, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper discusses the two leading views of history and political institutions. For some scholars, institutions are mainly products of historical logic, while for others, accidents, leaders, and decisions have a significant impact. We argue that while there is clear evidence that history matters and has long-term effects, there is not enough data to help us distinguish between the two views. Faced with this uncertainty, what is a social scientist to do? We argue that given the possibility that policy decisions indeed make a difference, it makes sense to assume they do and to try to improve policymaking.

Keywords: Political economy; Determinism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N30 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-hpe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Journal Article: Under the Thumb of History? Political Institutions and the Scope for Action (2014)
Working Paper: Under the Thumb of History? Political institutions and the Scope for Action (2014)
Working Paper: Under the Thumb of History? Political Institutions and the Scope for Action (2014)
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