Social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining

Iris Bohnet and Richard Zeckhauser

CREMA Working Paper Series from Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Abstract: This paper employs experiments to examine the effects of social comparisons in ultimatum bargaining. We inform responders on the average offer before they decide whether to accept or reject their specific offer. To provide a metric for social comparison effects, we compare them with another change in informational conditions, asymmetric information on the pie size. Knowing comparable offers or knowing the pie size increases offers and rejection probabilities by similar magnitudes. Our results are consistent with people disliking deviations from the norm of equity but inconsistent with fairness theories, where people dislike income disparity between themselves and their referents.

Keywords: Experimental bargaining; social comparisons; asymmetric information; ultimatum game. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (74)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining (2004)
Working Paper: Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cra:wpaper:2004-08

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