Effects of supervision on tax compliance: Evidence from a field experiment in Austria

Katharina Gangl, Benno Torgler, Erich Kirchler and Eva Hofmann

CREMA Working Paper Series from Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA)

Abstract: The tax compliance literature has mainly focused on individual tax evasion rather than firm tax evasion. In general, there is a lack of field experiments on the topic, and measuring tax compliance is challenging. To address this shortcoming in the literature, we conduct a field experiment on firm tax compliance looking at newly founded firms. As a novelty we explore how firms react to closer supervision by the tax administration, looking at timely paying which has no measurement biases. Interestingly, we observe a crowding-out effect of supervision on timely paying of taxes. On the other hand, for those who were non-compliant, supervision reduced the tax amount that was due.

Keywords: tax compliance; tax evasion; field experiment; deterrence; tax enforcement; supervision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 H26 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-exp, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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