Marginal contributions and externalities in the value

Geoffroy de Clippel and Roberto Serrano

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: For games in partition function form, we explore the implications of distinguishing between the concepts of intrinsic marginal contributions and externalities. If one requires efficiency for the grand coalition, we provide several results concerning extensions of the Shapley value. Using the axioms of efficiency, anonymity, marginality and monotonicity, we provide upper and lower bounds to players' payoffs when affected by external effects, and a characterization of an ''externality-free'' value. If the grand coalition does not form, we characterize a payoff configuration on the basis of the principle of balanced contributions. We also analyze a game of coalition formation that yields sharp predictions

Date: 2005-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value (2008)
Working Paper: Marginal contributions and externalities in the value (2007)
Working Paper: Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:we057339

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