Cordon pricing in the monocentric city: theory and application to Paris region

André de Palma (), Moez Kilani, Michel de Lara and Serge Piperno
Additional contact information
Michel de Lara: Université de Paris-Est, CERMICS
Serge Piperno: Université de Paris-Est, CERMICS

No 2011027, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: We propose a method to compute an equilibrium solution for the monocentric city model with traffic congestion, and to quantify the impact of cordon tolls on social surplus. The focus of this paper is on the comparison of road pricing of one and two cordons, with the no toll and first-best situations as benchmarks. We find that a one-cordon toll yields a social efficiency of 63% with respect to first-best, and that an optimal two-cordon toll increases the efficiency to 73%. Both policies have a positive impact on CO2 emissions because they reduce the average length of trips and reduce the road size.

Keywords: monocentric model; cordon toll; acceptability of road pricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: R21 R41 R48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
Date: 2011-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-tre and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Cordon pricing in the monocentric city: theory and application to Paris region (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ctl:louvre:2011027

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