European Monetary Policy and the ECB Rotation Model: Voting Power of the Core versus the Periphery

Ansgar Belke and Barbara von Schnurbein

No 983, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: We analyze the ECB Governing Council's voting procedures. The literature has by now discussed numerous aspects of the rotation model but does not account for many institutional aspects of the voting procedure of the GC. Using the randomization scheme based on the multilinear extension (MLE) of games, we try to close three of these gaps. First, we integrate specific preferences of national central bank presidents, i.e. their desired interest rates. Second, we address the agenda-setting power of the ECB president. Third, we do not simulate an average of the decisions but look at every relevant point in time separately.

Keywords: Euro area; European Central Bank; monetary policy; rotation; voting rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 p.
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-cdm, nep-eec and nep-mon
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.353447.de/dp983.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: European Monetary Policy and the ECB Rotation Model – Voting Power of the Core versus the Periphery (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp983

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bibliothek ().