Debt Maturity, Ownership Concentration, and Firm Efficiency

Samuele Murtinu

Economics Bulletin, 2015, vol. 35, issue 4, 2610-2616

Abstract: I study the relationship between debt maturity and agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders in unlisted firms. Exploiting cross-province variance in the development of local credit markets, I find that the monitoring effect of short-term bank debt is more effective in firms with less concentrated ownership structures.

Keywords: Ownership concentration; efficiency; agency cost; debt maturity; monitoring; bank; ownership structure; firm performance; corporate governance; financial debt; unlisted firm; local credit market; endogeneity; agency conflict; entrepreneurial firm; owner-managed firm; minority shareholder; corporate finance; capital structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12-13
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2015/Volume35/EB-15-V35-I4-P262.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-15-00486

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().