Honours as a signal - evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in Italy Abstract: This note compares the wage premium of honours degrees in two different Italian university systems (old and new) in 2011 using data from the Italian National Institute of Statistics. The wage premium of a honours degree in the new system disappears due to honours inflation and hence the signal of potential higher productivity stopped working. In contrast, for graduates under the old system, the signal statistically significantly affects wages

Marina Töpfer ()
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Marina Töpfer: University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

Economics Bulletin, 2019, vol. 39, issue 1, 1-7

Keywords: Signalling Model; Higher Education; Italy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I2 J1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01-09
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