Optimal mechanisms for the control of fiscal deficits

Hans Peter Grüner

No 1708, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: This paper shows that a simple two-stage voting mechanism may implement a constrained optimal state dependent decision about a fiscal deficit. I consider a setup with strategic fiscal deficits JEL Classification: D82, H62

Keywords: constitutional choice; fiscal policy rules; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-pbe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20141708

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