Lobbying in Europe: new firm-level evidence

Konstantinos Dellis and David Sondermann

No 2071, Working Paper Series from European Central Bank

Abstract: Lobbying can provide policy makers with important sector-specific information and thereby facilitating informed decisions. If going far beyond this, in particular if successfully influencing policy makers to unnecessarily tighten regulation or not opening already excessively regulated markets, it could potentially reduce overall economic welfare. We create a unique firm-level database on EU lobby activity and firm characteristics. We tend to find that firms in more protected sector, e.g. firms from non-tradable or higher regulated sectors tend to spend more for lobby activities. Also such firms tend to have higher profit margins and lower productivity, as often the case in sheltered sectors. JEL Classification: D72, D78, O38

Keywords: lobbying; political economy; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-eur and nep-reg
Note: 943715
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20172071

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