The Politics of Foreclosures

Sumit Agarwal, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David and Serdar Dinc
Additional contact information
Sumit Agarwal: Georgetown University
Serdar Dinc: Rutgers University

Working Paper Series from Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics

Abstract: U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee considered many important banking reforms in 2009-2010 including the Dodd-Frank Act. We show that during this period, the foreclosure starts on delinquent mortgages were delayed in the districts of committee members even though there was no difference in delinquency rates between committee and non-committee districts. In these areas, banks delayed the start of the foreclosure process by 0.5 months (relative to the 12-month average). The total estimated cost of delay to lenders is an order of magnitude greater than the campaign contributions by the Political Action Committees of the largest mortgage servicing banks to the committee members in that period and is comparable to these banks’ lobbying expenditures.

JEL-codes: D72 G01 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cfn, nep-pol and nep-ure
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Politics of Foreclosures (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:ohidic:2017-21

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