The War of Information

Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer (pesendor@princeton.edu)
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Faruk Gul: Princeton University

Papers from Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy

Abstract: We analyze political campaigns between two parties with opposing interests. Parties pay a cost to provide information to a voter who chooses the policy. The information flow is continuous and stops when parties quit. The parties' actions are strategic substitutes: a party with a lower cost provides more but its opponent provides less information. For voters, the parties' actions are complements and raising the low-cost party's cost may be beneficial. Asymmetric information adds a signaling component in the form of a belief-threshold beyond which unfavorable information is offset by the informed party's decision to continue campaigning.

Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.princeton.edu/~pesendor/warinfo.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: The War of Information (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:prirpe:9-13-2010

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