A Decomposition Algorithm for N-Player Games

Srihari Govindan and Robert Wilson ()

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: An N-player game can be approximated by adding a coordinator who interacts bilaterally with each player. The coordinator proposes strategies to the players, and his payoff is maximized when each player's optimal reply agrees with his proposal. When the feasible set of proposals is finite, a solution of an associated linear complementarity problem yields an approximate equilibrium of the original game. Computational efficiency is improved by using the vertices of Kuhn's triangulation of the players' strategy space for the coordinator's pure strategies. Computational experience is reported.

Date: 2007-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp and nep-gth
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Journal Article: A decomposition algorithm for N-player games (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:1967

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