Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment

Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz
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Michael Schwarz: Yahoo! Labs

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: We present the results of a large field experiment on setting reserve prices in auctions for online advertisements, guided by the theory of optimal auction design suitably adapted to the sponsored search setting. Consistent with the theory, following the introduction of new reserve prices revenues in these auctions have increased substantially.

Date: 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-ict and nep-mkt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:2054

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