The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans

Christopher S. Armstrong, Ian D. Gow and David F. Larcker
Additional contact information
Christopher S. Armstrong: University PA
Ian D. Gow: Harvard University
David F. Larcker: Rock Center for Corporate Governance, Stanford University

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: This study examines the effects of shareholder support for equity compensation plans on subsequent chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. Using cross-sectional regression, instrumental variable, and regression discontinuity research designs, we find little evidence that either lower shareholder voting support for, or outright rejection of, proposed equity compensation plans leads to decreases in the level or composition of future CEO incentive-compensation. We also find that in cases where the equity compensation plan is rejected by shareholders, firms are more likely to propose, and shareholders are more likely to approve, a plan the following year. Our results suggest that shareholder votes have little substantive impact on firms' incentive-compensation policies. Thus, recent regulatory efforts aimed at strengthening shareholder voting rights, particularly in the context of executive compensation, may have limited effect on firms' compensation policies.

JEL-codes: G30 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:2097

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