Games with Unawareness

Yossi Feinberg
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Yossi Feinberg: Stanford University

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: We provide a tool to model and solve strategic situations where players' perceptions are limited, in the sense that they may only be aware of, or model, some of the aspects of the strategic situations at hand, as well as situations where players realize that other players' perceptions may be limited. We define normal, repeated, incomplete information and dynamic (extensive) form games with unawareness using a unified methodology. A game with unawareness is defined as a collection of standard games (of the corresponding form). The collection specifies how each player views the game, how she views the other players' perceptions of the game and so on. The modeler's description of perceptions, the players' description of other players' reasoning, etc. are shown to have consistent representations. We extend solution concepts such as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium to these games and study their properties. It is shown that while unawareness in normal form games can be mapped to incomplete information games, the extended Nash equilibrium solution is not mapped to a known solution concept in the equivalent incomplete information games, implying that games with unawareness generate novel types of behavior.

JEL-codes: C72 D81 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-neu
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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