Advertising Competition in Presidential Elections

Brett Gordon () and Wesley R. Hartmann
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Wesley R. Hartmann: Stanford University

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: Presidential candidates choose advertising strategically across markets based on each state's potential to tip the election. The winner-take-all rules in the Electoral College concentrate advertising in battleground states, ignoring most voters. We estimate an equilibrium model of competition between candidates to evaluate advertising and voting outcomes. In a direct vote counterfactual, all states receive positive advertising and both expenditures and turnout increase. Although states' political preferences drive competition in the Electoral College, candidates focus on cheap advertising targets in a direct vote. Simulations removing advertising price variation suggest a direct vote. Simulations removing advertising price variation suggest a direct vote spreads political attention uniformly across markets with diverse preferences.

JEL-codes: D72 L10 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mkt and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Advertising competition in presidential elections (2016)
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