Shell Games: Are Chinese Reverse Merger Firms Inherently Toxic?
Charles Lee,
Kevin K. Li and
Ran Zhang
Additional contact information
Kevin K. Li: University of Toronto
Ran Zhang: Peking University
Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business
Abstract:
We examine the financial health and performance of reverse mergers (RMs) that became active on U.S. stock markets between 2001 and 2010, particularly those from China (around 85% of all foreign RMs). As a group, RMs are small, early-stage companies that typically trade over-the-counter. Chinese RMs (CRMs), however, tend to be more mature and less speculative than either their U.S. counterparts or a group of exchange-industry-size matched firms. Collectively, CRMs outperformed their matched peers from inception through the end of 2011, even after including most of the firms accused of accounting fraud. CRMs that receive private-equity (PIPE) financing from sophisticated investors perform particularly well. Overall, despite the negative publicity (some from short sellers), we find little evidence that CRMs are inherently toxic investments. Our results shed light on the risk-performance trade-off for CRMs, as well as the delicate balance between credibility and access in well-functioning markets.
JEL-codes: G34 M41 N20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-mfd and nep-tra
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/worki ... rms-inherently-toxic
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:3063
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().