Crossing Party Lines: The Effects of Information on Redistributive Politics

Katherine Casey
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Katherine Casey: Stanford University

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: Many lament that weak accountability and poor governance impede economic development in Africa. Politicians rely on ethnic allegiances that deliver the vote irrespective of performance, dampening electoral incentives. Giving voters information about candidate competence counters ethnic loyalty and strengthens accountability. I extend a canonical electoral model to show how information provision flows through voter behavior and ultimately impacts the distribution of political spending. I test the theory on data from Sierra Leone using decentralization and differential radio coverage to identify information's effects. Estimates suggest that information increases voting across ethnic-party lines and induces a more equitable allocation of campaign spending.

JEL-codes: D72 H41 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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