Centralization versus Separation of Regulatory Institutions

Dana Foarta and Takuo Sugaya
Additional contact information
Takuo Sugaya: Stanford University

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: Why might a country choose a decentralized rather than a centralized regulatory structure? And what might reverse this choice? We consider a core institutional relationship in regulation. A regulator exerts effort towards a final outcome, but an oversight authority can intervene, which prevents the final outcome from being reached. We examine the choice between institutional centralization and separation, where centralization affords the oversight authority more information on the probable outcome. This creates a static trade-off in which more information lowers regulatory effort. Dynamically, institutional separation improves the screening of regulators. This leads to switching between centralization and separation in equilibrium.

Date: 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/gsb-cmis/gsb-cmis-download-auth/428106
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:3489

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().