The Delegate Paradox: Why Polarized Politicians Can Represent Citizens Best

Douglas J. Ahler and David E. Broockman
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Douglas J. Ahler: FL State University
David E. Broockman: Stanford University

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: Many argue for political reforms intended to resolve apparent disjunctures between politicians' ideologically polarized policy positions and citizens less-polarized policy preferences. Here we show such apparent disjunctures can arise even when politicians represent their constituencies well, and that resolving them would likely degrade political representation. These counterintuitive results arise from a paradox whereby polarized politicians can best represent constituencies comprised of citizens with idiosyncratic preferences. We document this paradox among U.S. House Members, often criticized for excessive polarization. We show that if House Members represented their constituencies' preferences as closely as possible, they would still be polarized. Moreover, current Members nearly always represent their constituencies better than counterfactual less-polarized Members. A series of experiments confirms that even 'moderate' citizens often prefer polarized representatives to less-polarized alternatives.

Date: 2017-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:3517

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