Mean Field Equilibrium: Uniqueness, Existence, and Comparative Statics

Bar Light and Gabriel Weintraub
Additional contact information
Gabriel Weintraub: Graduate School of Business, Stanford University

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: The standard solution concept for stochastic games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE); however, its computation becomes intractable as the number of players increases. Instead, we consider mean field equilibrium (MFE) that has been popularized in the recent literature. MFE takes advantage of averaging effects in models with a large number of agents. We make three main contributions. First, our main result in the paper provides conditions that ensure the uniqueness of an MFE. Second, we generalize previous MFE existence results. Third, we provide general comparative statics results. We apply our results to dynamic oligopoly models and to heterogeneous agent macroeconomic models commonly used in previous work. We believe our uniqueness result is the first of its nature in the class of models we study.

Date: 2018-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/gsb-cmis/gsb-cmis-download-auth/470096
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Working Paper: Mean Field Equilibrium: Uniqueness, Existence, and Comparative Statics (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:3731

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().