Propaganda, Conspiracy Theories, and Accountability in Fragile Democracies

Anqi Li, Davin Raiha and Ken Shotts
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Anqi Li: Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis
Davin Raiha: Kelley School of Business, Indiana University
Ken Shotts: Stanford Graduate School of Business

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: We develop a model of electoral accountability in the presence of mainstream and alternative media outlets. In addition to standard high and low competence types, the incumbent may be an aspiring autocrat, who controls the mainstream media and will cause substantial harm if not removed from office. Alternative media can help voters identify and remove aspiring autocrats and can enable voters to focus on honest mainstream media assessments of incumbents’ competence. But malicious alternative media that peddle false conspiracy theories about the incumbent and the mainstream media can induce voters to mistakenly remove nonautocratic incumbents, which in turn demotivates incumbent effort and undermines accountability. The alternative media is most beneficial when it is honest and known to be honest. It is most dangerous when it is sufficiently credible that voters pay attention to it, but sufficiently likely to be malicious that it undermines accountability.

Date: 2019-10
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