Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction

Michael Ostrovsky and Andrzej Skrzypacz

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: We revisit the classic result on the (non-)existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the Generalized First-Price Auction for sponsored search advertising and show that the conclusion may be reversed when ads are ranked based on the product of stochastic quality scores and bid amounts, rather than solely on the latter. Moreover, the expected revenue in the pure strategy equilibrium of the Generalized First-Price Auction may substantially exceed that of the Generalized Second-Price Auction.

Date: 2022-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:4043

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