Election-Denying Republican Candidates Underperformed in the 2022 Midterms

Janet Malzahn and Andrew B. Hall
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Janet Malzahn: Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford U
Andrew B. Hall: Stanford U

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: We combine newly collected election data with records of public denials of the results of the 2020 election to estimate the degree to which election-denying Republican candidates for senator, governor, secretary of state, and attorney general over- or under-performed other Republicans in 2022. We find that the average vote share of election-denying Republicans in statewide races was approximately 2.3 percentage points lower than their co-partisans after accounting for state- level partisanship. Election-denying candidates received roughly 2 percentage-points more vote share than other Republican candidates in primaries, on average, although this estimate is quite uncertain. The general-election penalty is larger than the margin of victory in battleground states in recent close presidential elections, suggesting that nominating election-denying can- didates in 2024 could be a damaging electoral strategy for Republicans. At the same time, it is small enough to suggest that only a relatively small group of voters changed their vote in response to having an election-denying candidate on the ballot.

Date: 2023-02
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