Conservation by Lending

Bard Harstad and Kjetil Storesletten

Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Abstract: This project analyzes how a political incumbent can be motivated to conserve rather than exploit a depletable resource. This political economy problem is relevant for tropical deforestation as well as for other environmental problems. It is shown that the larger is turnover of policymakers (e.g., because of political instability), the more the principal benefits from conservation by lending compared to flow payments (in return for lower deforestation). Conservation by lending exploits the political incumbent's impatience (and time inconsistency) by offering a loan with repayments that are contingent on the forest cover.

Date: 2023-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-env and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/work ... conservation-lending

Related works:
Working Paper: Conservation by Lending (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecl:stabus:4120

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Research Papers from Stanford University, Graduate School of Business Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().