How does resolution of strategy affect network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma games?

Jun Tanimoto

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2017, vol. 301, issue C, 36-42

Abstract: In the canonical framework of evolutionary 2×2 games, a binary strategy set comprising cooperation (C) and defection (D) has usually been presumed. Inspired by commonly observed real-world facts, we explore what happens if the resolution of strategy increases. As an extreme limit, the infinite resolution case is both a continuous and a mixed strategy defined by a real number in the range of [0,1]. We find that increasing resolution amplifies cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games as compared with the binary strategy definition; however, this enhancement tendency with increasing resolution is not monotonic in the case of a mixed-strategy setting.

Keywords: Network reciprocity; Prisoner's dilemma; Evolutionary game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:301:y:2017:i:c:p:36-42

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2016.11.036

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