Logit selection promotes cooperation in voluntary public goods game

Jinna Lu, Lu Wang, Yi-Ling Wang and Xiaoguang Zhang

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2017, vol. 310, issue C, 134-138

Abstract: In this paper, we present a simple yet effective model to promote cooperation in selfish population, namely, a spatial evolutionary public goods game model that includes three kinds of players: cooperator, defector and loner. In spatial settings, the players locate on a regular lattice, and each player randomly selects one strategy, then all the player acquire their payoffs with their four nearest neighbors, after that the focal player chooses a neighbor based on the logit selection model and updates his/her strategy in accordance with a random sequential simulation procedure. The Monte Carlo simulation results demonstrate that the ruthless invasion of defectors can be efficiently prevented by the loners, especially when enhanced factor r is low. Further interesting is the fact that the introduction of a logit selection model, making the fittest neighbors more likely to act as sources of adopted strategies, effectively promotes the evolution of cooperation even if the loner is absence.

Keywords: Game theory; Nonlinear dynamics; Complex networks; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:310:y:2017:i:c:p:134-138

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2017.04.027

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