 Publishing the donation list incompletely promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods gameQiao Chen, Tong Chen and Yongjie Wang Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2017, vol. 310, issue C, 48-56 Abstract: Since the donation list contains a lot of information, the cooperation may be promoted if the list can be skillfully applied. If the donation list is published completely, it will be considered as moral coercion. However, it is unfair to cooperators who contribute more money if organizers do not publish the list. Thus, how to publish the donation list properly is a subject worth studying. In our paper, we take reputation, behavior diversity and face culture into account at the same time to study the role of donation list in the public goods game. The results of numerical simulations show that the effect of publishing the list incompletely is better than that of publishing it completely or keeping it secret. Furthermore, there exists an optimum threshold to make the results best. And reasonable neighborhood relations are needed to promote cooperation. In addition, some personal attributes, such as the habit of data selection and mental capacity, have influences on cooperation. Keywords: Donation list; Face; Reputation; Public goods game; Network; Agent-based model (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:310:y:2017:i:c:p:48-56 DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2017.04.017 Access Statistics for this article Applied Mathematics and Computation is currently edited by Theodore Simos More articles in Applied Mathematics and Computation from Elsevier |
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