Central governance based on monitoring and reporting solves the collective-risk social dilemma
Nanrong He,
Xiaojie Chen and
Attila Szolnoki
Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2019, vol. 347, issue C, 334-341
Abstract:
Monitoring and reporting incorrect acts are pervasive for maintaining human cooperation, but in theory it is unclear how they influence each other. To explore their possible interactions we consider spatially structured population where individuals face the collective-risk social dilemma. In our minimal model cooperator players report defection according to the loss of their interests. In parallel we assume a monitoring institution that monitors all group member and identifies wrong behavior with a certain probability. In response to these feedbacks a sanctioning institution develops punishment schemes by imposing fines on related defector players stochastically. By means of Monte Carlo simulations, we find that the introduction of monitoring and reporting mechanisms can greatly promote the evolution of cooperation and there exists a sudden change of the cooperation level by varying model parameters, which can lead to an outbreak of cooperation for solving the collective-risk social dilemma.
Keywords: Cooperation; Punishment; Monitoring; Reporting; Common resource (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:347:y:2019:i:c:p:334-341
DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2018.11.029
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