 Expectation driven by update willingness promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma gameQiuling Wang and Danyang Jia Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2019, vol. 352, issue C, 174-179 Abstract: In real life, everyone is full of yearning and pursuit for future life. The difference between reality and ideals encourage people to constantly adjust the current state, so that they can better adapt to changes in the surrounding environment. Thus, we propose a spatial prisoner's dilemma game model where individuals have expectation towards the payoff obtained from nearest neighbors, and individuals can adaptively adjust their update willingness based on the satisfaction of income. Through numerical calculation, we find that different b values will have an appropriate aspiration level to promote cooperation. In addition, the results have an obvious phase transition phenomenon for individual's aspiration level on promoting cooperation. Moreover, only moderate aspiration level can promote the evolution of cooperative behavior, due to it can lead to the heterogeneous distribution of update willingness, which will be beneficial to the evolution of cooperation. Keywords: Expectation; Cooperation; Update willingness; Coevolution; Social dilemma; Heterogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:352:y:2019:i:c:p:174-179 DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2019.01.057 Access Statistics for this article Applied Mathematics and Computation is currently edited by Theodore Simos More articles in Applied Mathematics and Computation from Elsevier |
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