Common knowledge equilibrium of Boolean securities in distributed information market

Masahiko Ueda

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2020, vol. 386, issue C

Abstract: We investigate common knowledge equilibrium of separable (or parity) and totally symmetric Boolean securities in distributed information market. We theoretically show that clearing price converges to the true value when a common prior probability distribution of information of each player satisfies some conditions.

Keywords: Distributed information market; Common knowledge equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:386:y:2020:i:c:s0096300320304963

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2020.125540

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