Promoting cooperation by reputation scoring mechanism based on historical donations in public goods game

Le Wang, Tong Chen and Zhenghong Wu

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2021, vol. 390, issue C

Abstract: In an acquaintance society, reputation plays an important role in individuals’ activities. Especially when we face with collective decision-making, such as crowd-funding. The existence of reputation could stimulate cooperation. In this work, individuals’ reputation has been divided into being good, bad and medium according to their neighbors’ judgement. Considering people with different requirements of reputation, we put forward a new reputation scoring mechanism with tolerance based on historical donations. First, we study the effect of different scoring rules on players’ strategies. Based on this, we discuss the effect of neighbors’ reputation on players’ simulation process. In addition, we explore the population structure’s influence on cooperation. Through numerical simulations, we are glad to find that the strict scoring rules could better stimulate cooperation in most circumstances. Moreover, imitation which depends on both reputation and payoff could promote cooperation. And individuals with good reputation have better effect on cooperation compared to those with bad reputation. This work provides a new reference for organizers to promote more people to participate and cooperate in Public Goods Game (PGG).

Keywords: Reputation; Scoring mechanism; Cooperation; Public goods game; Tolerance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:390:y:2021:i:c:s0096300320305609

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2020.125605

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