Effect of collective influence on the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games

Yajun Mao, Zhihai Rong and Zhi-Xi Wu

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2021, vol. 392, issue C

Abstract: Node centrality plays an important role in many dynamical processes taking place on complex networks. In this work, we associate the individuals’ collective influence (CI) with their strategy-updating time scales to investigate how the diverse collective influence of individuals affects the evolution of cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on scale-free networks. With the combination of time scale mechanism which bridges the feedback between strategy-updating time scale and the performance of individuals, we find that influential cooperators locating at medium- or small-degrees are able to spread their behaviors among neighbors in a more efficient way than hubs with large-degrees. Hence, collective influence with proper path length can efficiently identify influencers and may promote the emergence of cooperation on heterogeneous interaction networks.

Keywords: Scale-free networks; Evolutionary game theory; Collective influence; Time scale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:392:y:2021:i:c:s0096300320306329

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2020.125679

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