 Preference reversal and the evolution of cooperationShiping Gao and Nan Li Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2023, vol. 438, issue C Abstract: Exploring the evolution of cooperation has garnered increasing interest in a variety of fields, yet the majority of existing models assume that individuals’ preferences are fixed and stable. Preference reversal, a systematic disparity between people’s valuations and choices, implies that individuals’ preferences are inherently unstable and changing. To better understand how cooperation evolves, we develop a simple model with preference reversal in the context of the public goods game, in which the decision on whether and how to punish defectors is heavily influenced by the cooperators’ preference for punishment in two decision-making processes. We explore the effects of preference reversal on the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in infinitely well-mixed populations. We also specify the scenarios where preference reversal favors cooperation. The chance of preference reversal as well as the predisposing conditions for preference reversal are critical in determining whether preference reversal facilitates the emergence of cooperation. Keywords: Human behavior; Cooperation; Preference reversal; Punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:438:y:2023:i:c:s0096300322006415 DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2022.127567 Access Statistics for this article Applied Mathematics and Computation is currently edited by Theodore Simos More articles in Applied Mathematics and Computation from Elsevier |
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