Combined effect of pure punishment and reward in the public goods game

Xingping Sun, Mingyuan Li, Hongwei Kang, Yong Shen and Qingyi Chen

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2023, vol. 445, issue C

Abstract: The evolution of cooperation in public goods games based on the evolutionary game theory has been widely studied to obtain potential solutions to social dilemmas. In addition, as the main factors of human cooperation, reward and punishment have also been widely studied. In this paper, the manipulators are introduced into the game. It is assumed that manipulators both reward cooperators and punish pure defectors, but do not contribute to the common pool. The evolution of manipulators with cooperators and defectors is analyzed on a square lattice. The results show that the combination of pure punishment and reward is effective in maintaining cooperation. Moreover, for any synergy factor, there is a wide range of parameters that allow for the coexistence of manipulators and cooperators.

Keywords: Public goods game; Cooperation; Punishment; Reward; Pure punishment; Pure reward (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:445:y:2023:i:c:s009630032300022x

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2023.127853

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