The impact of labor subsidy, taxation and corruption on individual behavior

Dun Han and Youxin He

Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2023, vol. 458, issue C

Abstract: In this study, the effects of labor subsidy, taxation, and corruption mechanism on individual behavior are examined within the context of the public goods game. A specific focus is placed on the investigation of how individuals can obtain labor subsidies through the implementation of reward and punishment strategies based on taxation. The findings reveal that a moderate labor subsidy value fosters stable alliances between cooperators and executors, effectively excluding defectors, and this system remains robust under high tax levels. Additionally, it is noted that only the incentive provided by the reward mechanism can facilitate the invasion of defectors. Intuitively, the presence of a corruption mechanism exerts minimal influence on the average level of individual behavior when executors receive increased labor subsidies.

Keywords: The public goods game; Labor subsidy; Taxation; Corruption mechanism; Reward and punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:458:y:2023:i:c:s0096300323004162

DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2023.128247

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